Fewer Mistakes on the First Day: Architectural Strategies and Their Impacts on Acquisition Outcomes by McCabe, Linda & Wicht, Anthony
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Reports and Technical Reports All Technical Reports Collection
2013-04-01
Fewer Mistakes on the First Day:
Architectural Strategies and Their
Impacts on Acquisition Outcomes
McCabe, Linda


















Fewer Mistakes on the First Day: Architectural 
Strategies and Their Impacts on Acquisition 
Outcomes 
Linda McCabe and Anthony Wicht 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Published April 1, 2013 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
Prepared for the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943. 
Disclaimer: The views represented in this report are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy 






The research presented in this report was supported by the Acquisition Research Program 
of the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
To request defense acquisition research, to become a research sponsor, or to print 
additional copies of reports, please contact any of the staff listed on the Acquisition 
Research Program website (www.acquisitionresearch.net). 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= -=i - 
=
Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Tenth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! We regret that this 
year it will be a “paper only” event. The double whammy of sequestration and a continuing 
resolution, with the attendant restrictions on travel and conferences, created too much 
uncertainty to properly stage the event. We will miss the dialogue with our acquisition 
colleagues and the opportunity for all our researchers to present their work. However, we 
intend to simulate the symposium as best we can, and these Proceedings present an 
opportunity for the papers to be published just as if they had been delivered. In any case, we 
will have a rich store of papers to draw from for next year’s event scheduled for May 14–15, 
2014! 
Despite these temporary setbacks, our Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) continues at a normal pace. Since the ARP’s 
founding in 2003, over 1,200 original research reports have been added to the acquisition 
body of knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 70 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and encourage your future participation. 
Unfortunately, what will be missing this year is the active participation and 
networking that has been the hallmark of previous symposia. By purposely limiting 
attendance to 350 people, we encourage just that. This forum remains unique in its effort to 
bring scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. It provides the opportunity to interact with many top DoD 
acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both in the formal 
panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, breaks, and the 
day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to establish new teaming 
arrangements for future research work. Despite the fact that we will not be gathered 
together to reap the above-listed benefits, the ARP will endeavor to stimulate this dialogue 
through various means throughout the year as we interact with our researchers and DoD 
officials.  
Affordability remains a major focus in the DoD acquisition world and will no doubt get 
even more attention as the sequestration outcomes unfold. It is a central tenet of the DoD’s 
Better Buying Power initiatives, which continue to evolve as the DoD finds which of them 
work and which do not. This suggests that research with a focus on affordability will be of 
great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to come. Whether you’re a practitioner or 
scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
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infrastructure. Prior to attending MIT, Mr. Wicht worked as a project finance lawyer at a major 
Australian law firm on legal aspects of financing and constructing large engineering projects. He is a 
former president of the National Space Society of Australia and is co-chair of the Australian Space 
Development Conference series. 
Abstract 
Reducing cost and development time, while preserving acceptable levels of performance, is a 
priority for all government-sponsored complex product development. One avenue for 
improving outcomes is to use architecting strategies to guide development decisions. 
Frequent examples are commonality, interoperability, modularity, flexibility, extensibility, 
robustness, openness, and adaptability. A second avenue for improving outcomes is better 
acquisition strategies. The two are often considered in isolation. This paper begins an 
examination of how the choice of architecting strategy affects the choice of acquisition 
strategy, and vice versa. 
As a first step, the paper synthesizes existing literature and provides straightforward 
definitions of each of the architecting strategies. As a second step, the paper maps each of 
the defined architecting strategies against two common axes of acquisition design, 
specifically openness to competition and sensitivity to requirements change. The conclusions, 
while tentative, show that increasing attention to the interaction between how systems are 
designed and how they are acquired may have a significant effect on the cost, schedule, and 
performance of complex product development. 
Introduction 
Reducing cost and development time, while preserving acceptable levels of 
performance, is a priority for complex product development in both military and civilian 
systems. One avenue for improving development is to use particular architecting strategies 
to guide high-level development decisions. These strategies reflect the priorities that the 
customer places on different aspects of the product. Different strategies lead to different 
design decisions and ultimately different outcomes. For example, developments based on 
the “robustness” strategy might trade high performance under specific conditions for 
acceptable performance over a range of conditions. This paper considers common, 
modular, open, flexible, adaptable, robust, extensible, and interoperable architecting 
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strategies. Many of these strategies have at one time or another been exhorted as the 
solution to acquiring complex products.1 
However, there appears to be a disconnect between the use of these strategies and 
their effect on complex product development, particularly in the government sphere. New 
architecting strategies are encouraged at the highest levels, but the cost of acquiring new 
complex systems continues to climb (Berteau et al., 2010; Peters, 2009; Moore, 2011). 
We observed two factors that we hypothesized to be likely contributors to the lack of 
impact of these architecting strategies on project acquisition costs. The first factor is a lack 
of effective communication about what the architecting strategies mean, caused by a 
scarcity of definitions for the strategies, and compounded by the application of the strategies 
in engineering disciplines far removed from where the terms were first used. The second 
factor is a universal application of the strategies to all acquisitions, rather than to just those 
acquisitions where the strategy would be particularly relevant and helpful. 
The existing literature does not provide sufficient guidance on the architecting 
strategies, or the types of product acquisitions where they should be applied. The Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU) provides an excellent start, with brief definitions of many of the 
important terms in its Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms (Hagan, 2009), 
although flexibility, adaptability, and extensibility are not defined. A symposium paper from 
the MIT Engineering Systems Division discussing architecting strategies generally is also 
useful, but does not specifically define the strategies and the differences between them 
(Crawley et al., 2004). The DoD dictionary, which consolidates definitions provided in 
doctrine documents, defines only commonality (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010). Finally, even 
within the top 100 articles found doing a Google Scholar search for articles containing the 
words robust, flexible, common, interoperable, and extensible, none sets out definitions for 
these terms. Although these searches may not be exhaustive, they represent a much more 
detailed search for definitions than a professional is typically able to conduct when 
investigating architectural options. 
The specific objectives of this paper, therefore, are twofold. First, the paper aims to 
synthesize existing definitions of the design strategies into a single definition. This synthesis 
will provide a starting point for discussion of what the design strategies mean. Extensive 
comment and discussion about these definitions is anticipated, but consolidating all 
definitions into a single document and posing possible definitions for discussion is a 
prerequisite for this discussion, and represents an advance on the existing literature. 
Second, the paper aims to provide a coarse analysis of the acquisition scenarios to 
which each strategy is well suited. Such an analysis makes the broad point that different 
acquisition scenarios merit different design strategies, and not one design strategy is a 
panacea for all acquisition challenges. The analysis also makes more specific findings about 
the regions of suitability of each design strategy, in terms of certainty of requirements and 
openness to competition. 
In Section I, the paper examines the literature in detail. It presents a number of 
observations about the potential for confusion in the existing literature, and also highlights 
                                                
1 Commonality: “Commonality is the key to affordability” (DoD, 2013). Interoperability: “It is DOD 
Policy that . . . Department of Defense pursue materiel interoperability with allies and coalition 
partners” (Carter, 2009). Open Systems Architectures: “[Acquisition Professionals within DOD will ...] 
require open systems architectures” (Carter, 2010). “Program managers shall employ MOSA 
[Modular Open Systems Approach] to design for affordable change, enable evolutionary acquisition, 
and rapidly field affordable systems that are interoperable in the joint battle space” (DoD, 2008). 
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how reference is frequently made to the design strategies without an accompanying 
explanation of what is meant by those strategies. In Section II, standard definitions for each 
of the chosen architecting strategies (common, modular, open, flexible, adaptable, robust, 
extensible, and interoperable, referred to as the “Eight Strategies”) are proposed. Each 
definition is illustrated with examples from previous government acquisitions. Section III 
presents an analysis of the newly defined design strategies against two important 
acquisition parameters: (1) certainty of requirements, and (2) number of organizations 
involved. 
Finally, Section IV concludes the paper and presents suggestions for further work in 
this area. 
The Existing Literature Confuses More Than It Clarifies 
If architectural strategies are to be used for complex government acquisition projects, 
there is a need for all involved to understand the meaning of these strategies. This section 
of the paper reviews the existing definitions of architectural strategies and considers 
whether the definitions are consistent and easy to find. Definitions that are consistent and 
easy to find would be expected as a prerequisite to effectively using the architectural design 
strategies across government acquisitions. 
At the outset, it is important to be precise with terminology used in this paper. An 
architecture is “an abstract description of the entities of a system and the relationships 
between those entities” (Crawley et al., 2004). Put another way, architecture is “the 
arrangement of the functional elements into physical blocks” (Ulrich & Eppinger, 2008). 
Architecture is the underlying concept of how a complex system is brought together, the 
process of relating form to function in order to create value where value is benefit at cost. 
Different architectures have different properties. When the architecture clearly brings 
about a certain property in the final system, the final system is often referred to as having a 
“property-architecture.” For example, if the architecture is such that the final system is 
robust, then the system is described as having a robust architecture. We refer to the process 
of designing an architecture for a desired result as an architecting strategy. 
Surprisingly, we were able to find only a small number of references that presented 
and compared all or most of the architecting strategies. De Weck, Ross, and Rhodes (2012) 
investigated most of the architecting strategies presented in this paper but were concerned 
with them as “system properties” rather than architecting strategies. Their paper also 
focused on the interrelationships between the strategies rather than describing the 
strategies themselves. The symposium paper by the MIT Engineering Systems Division, The 
Influence of Architecture in Engineering Systems (Crawley et al., 2004), investigated 
definition in more detail. The paper described how architecture influences the properties of 
created systems, resulting in robustness, adaptability, flexibility, safety, and scalability. 
However, Crawley et al. focused on the importance of architecture rather than detailing 
different outcomes from the architecting process. Fricke and Schultz (2005) presented an 
excellent side-by-side view of adaptability, agility, flexibility, and robustness, but they did not 
extend their analysis beyond these “changeable” architectures. 
Finding other papers that compared architecting approaches proved difficult. A 
Google Scholar search for articles containing the words robust, flexible, common, 
interoperable, and extensible gives a surprising number of results—13,800—but no paper in 
the top 100 sets out definitions for these terms. In other cases, papers defined a few of the 
terms in domain-specific areas. For example, Ferguson, Siddiqi, Lewis, and de Weck (2007) 
examined flexible and reconfigurable systems in product design, but their definitions would 
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require thought and interpretation before application to another area, for example, 
information architectures. 
Nor is there assistance from the key textbooks in the area. The Art of System 
Architecting mentions some of these architecting strategies but does not contrast them or 
provide extensive detail. In Architecture and Principles of System Engineering, Dickerson 
and Mavris (2010) did not present definitions for any of the Eight Strategies. However, the 
terms themselves are mentioned, in some cases, in the sense we use them (“interoperable 
and cost effective military systems” [Dickerson & Mavris, 2010, p. 148], “methods and 
techniques to … design for robustness relative to uncertain operational environments” [p. 
313]), and in other cases in very different contexts (for example, openness is used in the 
context of stakeholder discussions, and flexibility in the context of “development flexibility, 
such as environmental limitations or regulatory standards”). 
In the government context, the situation does not improve greatly. A complete set of 
definitions does not exist. Of the Eight Strategies, the DoD dictionary, which consolidates 
definitions provided in doctrine documents, defines only commonality (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2010). The DAU provides brief definitions of many of the important terms in its Glossary of 
Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms, although flexibility, adaptability, and extensibility 
are not defined (Hagan, 2009). Further, some of the terms are narrowly defined. For 
example, module is used only in the context of software architectures. The DAU’s online 
“Terms and Definitions” (2013) defines three out of the Eight Strategies, and defines the 
substance of extensibility, though referring to it as scalability.  
Compounding the problem, the same term is used in the same community to mean 
different things. Defense Directive 5000.01 (Wolfowitz, 2007) emphasizes five key 
acquisition policies, one of which is flexibility. Dickerson and Mavris (2010) summarized 
flexibility in this context as the “need to structure each acquisition program according to the 
set of strategies, documentation, reviews, and phases that make sense for this program” (p. 
290). This is a different definition of flexibility than used by system architects in describing 
the properties of their systems. However, there are some bright spots in the government 
landscape. The push towards a “modular, open-systems architecture” by the Open Systems 
Joint Task Force (2004), shows significant development of the modular and open systems 
concepts through tens of pages of principles, definitions, and examples. 
Definitional confusion is not entirely due to a deficiency in the literature, however. 
The architecting strategies are often mentioned in the same breath but in fact are concerned 
with quite dissimilar things. Adaptability, flexibility, and robustness are characteristics of an 
end-product that describes how the product interacts with its environment, especially as that 
environment changes. Extensibility describes how the product is able to improve over time. 
Interoperable describes how the product interacts with other products in the operations 
phase. Commonality describes similarities with other products, usually in the development 
and operations phases. Modularity describes the physical structure of the product. 
Openness describes the process of acquiring the product. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
a single paper does not cover the range of architecting strategies, because they are quite 
different. 
Further, the architectural strategies inter-relate. Modularity emphasizes simple, well-
understood interfaces and so enables commonality (through reuse of existing products) and 
openness (by more easily tying together the contributions of different participants). 
Interoperable architectures require knowledge of the systems that interoperate, implying 
some level of openness. Interoperable architectures also work because of some degree of 
commonality, usually in the patterns of information exchange, so an interoperable 
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architecture could also be described as having, for example, a common communications 
protocol. 
The difficulties with using the existing literature to define architecting strategies can 
therefore be summarized as follows: 
 No single reference presents and compares all the architecting strategies. 
 Several key references refer to architecting strategies without defining them, 
assuming that they are well understood. 
 Where definitions are provided, they are often domain-specific. 
 The words chosen for the architecting strategies are sometimes used by the 
same communities, with different meanings. 
 The strategies interrelate, and multiple architecting strategies are often used 
to achieve a given result. 
Although this may appear a formidable list of obstacles, clear, widely available 
definitions of the architecting strategies will assist with resolving all of these difficulties. In 
the defense acquisition context, referring to the definitions of these strategies when 
proposing them as mandatory considerations in acquisition would improve communication of 
the desired outcomes. There is a precedent for such definitional foundation in the 
commonality literature. The RAND Corporation produced a report containing a standard 
commonality lexicon (Held, Lewis, & Newsome, 2007). A similar report examining the 
definitions described in Section II, with more detail and rigor, presents a possible solution to 
the current confusion in the literature. 
Defining Architectural Strategies 
In an attempt to remedy some of the confusion outlined in the previous section, this 
section provides an overview of architecting strategy definitions from the engineering 
literature, a relevant DoD example of each definition, a discussion of the definition as it 
relates to process versus architecture, and, because these strategies are often painted as a 
panacea for all new-product development ills, a description of the possible downsides of the 
approach. In the definitions that follow, we begin by discussing a simple example of each 
architecture strategy. Because low complexity examples are rare in the real world, we also 
discuss the application of each strategy to a more complex, and where possible, “system of 
systems” example. 
Flexible Architectures 
A flexible architecture is one that is easily modified to respond to changing 
requirements (Crawleyet al., 2004; Fricke & Schultz, 2005; Ferguson et al., 2007). The 
modification requires work to be done on the system. For example, an architecture that 
allows different external stores (often referred to as pods) to be loaded on military aircraft to 
provide different functionality for different missions would be described as a flexible 
architecture. External stores can provide numerous functions, including—but not limited to—
weapons, additional fuel, electronic counter measures (ECMs), communications, and 
sensors. A more complex example is the ability to load different software onto pre-defined 
hardware, such as is expected from software programmable radios. Loading new software 
changes the functionality of the radio to suit the operating environment. In each case, the 
designers considered that easily changing the system performance was important, and 
allowance for such changes was built into the architecture. The architectural choices permit 
product flexibility and therefore are described as a flexible architecture. The benefit of a 
flexible architecture is that a particular design continues to perform even as the environment 
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changes. For example, an entirely new airplane is not required simply because the range 
requirements for a certain mission exceed the internal fuel storage capacity of the aircraft. 
Flexibility is often associated with modularity if the flexibility arises through the 
swapping of modular parts (for example, weapons).2 Flexibility need not be dependent on a 
modular architecture, however. A flexible system could allow for software changes to be 
inserted without even unpacking the part from the case, as in the case of the Block III High 
Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM), a system designed to destroy radar equipped air 
defenses. The Block II HARM has its own software operating system, which can be 
upgraded in the field—and in the crate—to redefine its flight profile, its function, and how it 
interacts with the targeting system onboard the aircraft system. 
Flexibility is not always a positive attribute, however, as there is a price associated 
with designing systems to be flexible. Flexibility should be used only where uncertainty of 
requirements for the system means that the strategy is required. Crawley et al. (2004) put 
this succinctly: 
In some cases, flexibility comes at a price—namely, efficiency in some form. 
Flexibility may require over-design, generic components, extra interfaces, or 
changeover time. A less flexible system might have more focused 
components, fewer interfaces, and no loss due to changeover. 
Flexibility can in fact increase overall lifetime costs of a system, especially if the 
product lifetime is shorter than expected, due to the significant up-front cost. As the Army’s 
Future Combat System program office pointed out in its reaction to a GAO (2009) report,  
Because of the significant amount of new technology development and the 
emphasis on laying a good, flexible architecture foundation, development 
effort/costs may not follow typical expenditure rates as other projects, and a 
larger percentage will be needed in the early stages of the program. 
Adaptable Architectures 
Fricke and Schultz (2005) described adaptable systems as systems that “deliver their 
intended functionality under varying operating conditions through changing themselves.” In 
other words, an adaptable architecture modifies itself to meet a changing environment. An 
example from the commercial world is commercial power generation, which automatically 
brings additional power production online during high demand periods. In the defense 
context, an example of an adaptable system is radar. Most radar systems are able to 
change their receiver gain automatically in order to filter out noise generated by jamming. 
The difference between flexible and adaptable is subtle, and in the experience of the 
authors, those using the terms do not always grasp the difference. In particular, either term 
is often used as a catch all for the meaning of both terms. The difference between adaptable 
and flexible architectures has important cost implications for DoD projects. Adaptability 
usually places significantly greater demands on a system than flexibility but may be 
warranted in some cases, for example, where human intervention is impossible3 (such as a 
pacemaker), or where human reaction times are too slow (for example, the ACESII ejection 
seat, which automatically changes its ejection profile based on the altitude and airspeed of 
the aircraft at the time of ejection). 
                                                
2 De Weck, Ross, and Rhodes (2012) showed this as a strong link in their diagram of “ility co-
occurrence in the literature.” 
3 In the DoD context, adaptability in the context of situations where human intervention is impossible 
is tied to autonomy, which is commonly not acceptable given the high stakes involved in warfare and 
the unwillingness to take the human decision-maker out of the loop. 
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There is also overlap with other terminology. An open architecting process could be 
described as a flexible architecture because it allows new design implementations to be 
introduced over time. An “extensible” architecture can also be changed over time and 
therefore be characterized as “flexible,” albeit at the most inflexible end of flexible.4 Finally, a 
modular approach enables flexibility but is not enough in itself to guarantee flexibility.5 To 
conceptualize this, imagine a modular system, such as the aircraft with weapons discussed 
previously, where the weapons racks were welded to the aircraft frame. The design is no 
less modular, but the architecture is no longer flexible. 
Robust Architectures 
A robust architecture is one that is able to meet its performance specification over a 
wide range of, often unanticipated, external conditions and still perform well (Hagan, 2009; 
Crawley et al., 2004; Fricke & Schultz, 2005). This design strategy is often used when there 
is high uncertainty over the future performance requirements of a product (Thomke, 1997), 
or when the system itself is complex and not well understood (Crawley et al., 2004). The 
design approaches to achieve robustness are not well understood (Crawley et al., 2004), 
particularly in the area of software design. The benefit of a robust architecture is that the 
product keeps performing even as the external environment changes. Robustness may be 
preferred to flexibility or adaptability for a number of reasons. Robustness may be a lower 
cost approach because the system never needs to change. Robustness may also be 
preferred for situations where the range of environmental challenges is not well known. An 
example of a robust architecture from the defense context is the design of the Link-16 
protocol, which assumed that message traffic might get lost in the dynamic airborne 
environment. Therefore, it built significant redundancy into its message traffic, sending 
positional data and other messages multiple times per second to ensure delivery. A classic 
example of a robust architecture is the nuclear command and control architecture. Built into 
mountains and underground silos, and designed to operate in a post-nuclear attack radiation 
environment, robustness was clearly a main design criteria. 
System designs described as “robust” are more widely used than the strict definition 
above would allow. Some consider a robust design to be anything that copes with 
environmental changes and continues to perform. Robustness is also used as a synonym 
for survivability, to indicate continued performance when components of the system are 
damaged. Finally, some members of the defense community (perhaps showing some 
pessimism with the acquisitions process) use a robust design to mean one that actually 
works as designed under field conditions, using it interchangeably with “ruggedized” 
(Hawkes, 2013; Sherborne Sensors, 2013). To add to the confusion, Thomke’s (1997) 
paper, which contains excellent case studies into what we would call “robustness” in the 
design stage, describes the cases as “design flexibility.” 
It is obvious that a robust architecture will usually be more expensive upfront than a 
conventional architecture. The greater span of requirements often necessitates more time 
preparing better designs or more cost in manufacturing, as more exotic materials are used. 
Therefore, as with any architectural design choice, there is a cost-benefit tradeoff for a 
robust design. 
                                                
4 For clarity, systems that are intended to be changed back and forth many times are usually referred 
to as “flexible and reconfigurable” (Ferguson et al., 2007). 
5 A simple illustration of the link between flexibility and modularity can be seen with a Google Scholar 
search for (“flexible and modular” or “modular and flexible”), which yields ten times more results than 
(“flexible and robust” or “robust and flexible”). 
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Open Architectures 
Open architectures are becoming increasingly popular due to their prevalence, and 
success, in the software industry. Silver (2010) examined the history of open architectures in 
detail. An open architecture is one where the necessary information to design a part of the 
system is made accessible to the public or a wide group of possible designers. Hagan 
(2009) goes into more detail, defining an open system as  
a system that implements specifications maintained by an open, public 
consensus process for interfaces, services, and support formats, to enable 
properly engineered components to be utilized across a wide range of 
systems with minimal change, to interoperate with other components on local 
and remote systems, and to interact with users in a manner that facilitates 
portability.  
The essence of these definitions is that open architectures allow any interested 
organizations to participate in the design and development of parts of the system. This is not 
a new idea, but the fact that individuals anywhere, equipped with only a computer, can 
contribute to open software development, combined with the increased importance of 
software to complex projects, has meant that the pool of potential contributors to open 
architectures has widened over recent decades. The benefit of an open architecture is that 
better solutions can sometimes be found because more organizations have the chance to 
examine the problem and propose design solutions. The increased competition also has the 
potential to lower costs. 
An example from the defense context, though not yet officially sanctioned, is the 
growth of “Tactical iPhone apps” that have been developed both by soldiers and by small 
companies (Tactical Nav, 2013). These are built using the open interface exposed to 
applications developers by Apple. 
Openness is generally well understood and difficult to confuse with any of the other 
terms presented here. It is important to recognize that openness is more concerned with the 
process of development than the attributes of the end-state of the product. However, the 
system architect is concerned with process as well as end-state because the development 
process affects affordability by changing development cost. Therefore, in developing and 
comparing architectural strategies, it is valid to consider strategies that affect process. 
Open architectures have some significant drawbacks that are sometimes overlooked 
in the current enthusiasm for their use. Open architectures present coordination challenges 
for the government customer who must ensure that the products developed on the open 
market can interface to produce a usable end product. The broad dissemination of 
information about the end product may also present security concerns. 
Common Architectures 
A common architecture focuses on reuse of proven systems, or the design of 
platforms for later reuse (Wicht, 2011). With relatively simple systems, the key benefit is cost 
reduction, as much of the work from the first system is reused. Reusing systems and/or 
system components also decreases the development time associated with the system. With 
more complex systems, other benefits also become obvious: reliability increases because 
proven designs are reused and each part is used more often; maintenance and logistics are 
more affordable because there are fewer unique parts; less training is required as operators 
are familiar with previous instances of the product. 
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Examples from a DoD perspective include the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), which was 
designed in three variants with as many common parts as possible.6 Another example is the 
M61A1 20 mm cannon. This automatic weapon, often called the Vulcan, has been used in 
numerous Air Force aircraft (F-104, F-105, F-106, F-4, F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, A-7, F-111D, 
and most recently the F-22), the Navy PHALANX system, and the Army C-RAM. 
Commonality is straightforward in principle; however, it has significant overlap with 
modularity and interoperability. In a modular system, multiple common modules are often 
used to incrementally increase performance. The resulting system has strategies of both 
modularity and commonality. For example, some launch vehicles have a modular 
configuration with respect to the number of solid rocket boosters clustered around the 
vehicle core. For example, the Atlas V launch vehicle can have from zero to five solid rocket 
boosters attached to the core, depending on the particular payload and orbit of a launch.7 
Modularity also makes reuse easier and therefore enables commonality at a lower 
cost. Software modules are the canonical example of this, because good practice software 
writing encapsulates particular software tasks into modules, with defined inputs and outputs. 
If that functionality is required in a subsequent development, the module can be easily 
transplanted into the new context. Commonality and interoperability are also blurred. 
Interoperability generally requires a common (or “standardized”) interface. Therefore, the 
two systems are interoperable, or they share a common interface. The outcome is the same, 
but the terminology could be used differently. We suggest that if commonality is used solely 
for standardizing communications protocols for interoperability, the guiding strategy is 
interoperability. However, if the rationale is life-cycle cost savings from common design of 
terminals, hardware, or training procedures, then “commonality” is probably more 
appropriate. 
Commonality does not always produce benefits. For example, if requirements 
change and a new system is required, the additional up-front investment in designing a 
common system is lost. In some instances, the cost of designing and enforcing a common 
system outweighs the life-cycle cost savings of having the common system. This may be the 
case with the F-35, which has had “continuing manufacturing inefficiencies, parts problems, 
and technical changes [that] indicate that the aircraft’s design and production processes 
may lack the maturity needed to efficiently produce aircraft at planned rates” (GAO, 2011). 
The program was restructured in 2011, triggering a Nunn-McCurdy unit-cost breach. 
Performance is often penalized with a common system, with both systems having to share a 
system that suits neither of them perfectly. 
Modular Architectures 
To deal with complexity in systems, the idea of modularity is as old as engineering 
itself. Modularity allows a complex problem to be tackled in pieces. At its most basic, a 
modular architecture focuses on dividing the form of the system to reflect the functions of 
the system. This means that the system can be divided into chunks, each of which performs 
a distinct function. Baldwin and Clark (1999) had an elegant definition: “A module is a unit 
whose structural elements are powerfully connected among themselves and weakly 
connected to elements in other units.” This design strategy tends to produce “tidier” designs 
                                                
6 “The JSF program goals are to develop and field a family of stealthy strike fighter aircraft for the 
Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and U.S. allies, with maximum commonality to minimize costs” (GAO, 
2009). 
7 United Launch Alliance described the Atlas V under the heading “Modular System for Maximum 
Flexibility and Reliability” as using “a standard common core booster™ (CCB), up to five strap-on 
solid rocket boosters (SRB)” (United Launch Alliance, 2012). 
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with associated benefits to reliability and re-work cost. Modularity standardizes interfaces 
and minimizes the amount of information that needs to travel across those interfaces. More 
advanced modularity defines standard interfaces between aspects of the form of the system, 
and allows those pieces of form to be swapped out to produce different functions. This 
allows the product to perform across a greater range of external environments and to be 
upgraded more quickly and cheaply. For example, the computer and USB-peripheral 
architecture now used on personal computers is a modular architecture. The defined 
interface is the USB, and different forms with different functions can be connected to the 
computer via USB to improve the function of the system as a whole. A defense example of 
modularity is the guided bomb unit (GBU). GBUs are basically a series of modular parts, 
including guidance systems, ordnance, and fuses, among others, that can be assembled 
from the modules based on the need. Depending on the target and the desired effect, 
weaponeers basically build munitions from standard modular parts. There are a number of 
different approaches to modularity (Crawley et al., 2004), but all revolve around the same 
idea of neatly encapsulating product functions inside aspects of form. 
Discussions about modularity usually imply that modularity is beneficial for product 
development; however, this is not always the case. Modularity is beneficial if it assists the 
product in meeting its cost and performance goals, for example through enabling 
commonality, flexibility, or simply neater design with less re-work. Modularity requirements 
can be detrimental in applications where performance, space, or weight is at a premium. In 
these cases, modularizing the system may introduce unacceptable performance penalties. 
For example, an iPhone is a tightly integrated system. The touchscreen and camera are 
built into the casing, and the batteries are such an integral part of the unit that they cannot 
be separately replaced. This allows the iPhone to be made smaller, but makes it more 
difficult to reuse sections of the phone from model to model. Changes to the internal design 
between the iPhone 4 and the iPhone 4S meant that the positions of buttons on the case 
needed to shift. 
This tight interaction, where changes to one part of the product necessitate other 
changes, is typical of tightly integrated systems.8 A second example is writing high-
performance software. The use of “libraries” (pre-existing code, the software equivalent of 
modules) is minimized, and their functionality often re-written completely in order to optimize 
it for a particular application. Only the code absolutely required for the program to run is 
included.9 
Modularity also shows significant interaction with other architecting strategies, 
particularly open architectures. This is because openness usually outsources many of the 
design tasks, reducing the ongoing communication between the system architects and the 
product design teams, and increasing the risk of integration difficulties. Modularity’s 
emphasis on clearly defined interfaces and each module performing a single function 
mitigates integration risk, and therefore works well with an open architecture. An example of 
modularity and openness working together is the development of apps for smartphones. The 
apps are modular add-ons to improve the functionality of the phone and can be developed 
by anyone (i.e., a partially open architecture). In the defense context, modularity has been 
combined with open systems, which modularity enables. The result is “modular open-
systems architectures.” DoD Directive 5000.1 states that “acquisition programs shall be 
managed through the application of a systems engineering approach that optimizes total 
                                                
8 See, for example, Giffin et al. (2009), who found less change propagation through a system where 
“the architecture of [the] system was carefully crafted to be modular from the start.” 
9 “In structured software design, functionality and data is arranged in software modules” (Chakrabati, 
de Alfaro, Henzinger, Jurdzinski, & Mang, 2002). 
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system performance and minimizes total ownership costs. A modular, open systems 
approach shall be employed, where feasible” (Wolfowitz, 2007). This is another example of 
constructive interaction between two architecting strategies. 
Interoperable Architectures 
Almost all systems are interoperable with some other systems because nothing 
works in absolute isolation. Most electronic devices are interoperable with mains power; 
most computers are interoperable with Internet servers; most vehicles are interoperable with 
the highway systems in the countries for which they were built. Exceptions to these rules 
exist, but only in specialized applications. When we use the word interoperable architecture, 
therefore, it is not to describe these common situations where the interoperability is implicit, 
but rather to describe systems where the interoperability is a key requirement of the user. 
Further, interoperability is what defines systems in the sense that if there is no 
interaction, there is no system. If a broader perspective is taken, any product that is 
interoperable with another can therefore be seen as simply two parts of a single system. For 
example, one type of radio mounted in a ship could be described as interoperable with 
another type of radio mounted in an aircraft. Or, a broader system could be considered that 
includes both radios, in which case the interoperability is internal to the system. Therefore, 
simply depending on where the boundaries of the system are drawn, an interoperable 
architecture can refer to interoperability with systems outside the architecture or 
interoperability with systems internal to the architecture. 
The first view of “interoperable” is used to describe architectures capable of 
interfacing with specified systems external to the architecture under consideration, in order 
to improve its functionality. This is the usual level of consideration of the architecture and is 
the substance of Hagan’s (2009) definition of interoperability:  
The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide data, information, materiel, 
and services to and accept the same from other systems, units, or forces and 
to use the data, information, materiel, and services so exchanged to enable 
them to operate effectively together.  
Making a system interoperable usually increases the usefulness of that architecture. 
For example, designing a radio handset that can use existing waveforms increases the 
number of other radios with which it can communicate. The ability to interoperate external to 
the architecture under consideration permits wider communication than developing a new, 
unique waveform. This would usually make a more useful product than developing a new 
radio in isolation. 
The second way is a high-level view in which the elements of the architecture under 
consideration are themselves interoperable. This second view was referred to as “intra-
operability” by the Open Systems Joint Task Force (2004). For example, in designing a 
military communications network like the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), a guiding 
principle was that any radio on any platform running the same waveform could 
communicate. The JTRS architecture could therefore be described as an interoperable 
architecture, with the interoperation occurring within the system. To be more specific, this 
high-level view is often used for systems with separate physical elements that communicate 
information and where interoperation is not essential to the design. It would not be common 
to say that a set of radios designed for use by groups of infantry was an “interoperable 
architecture” because radios that are not interoperable with each other are generally 
useless. However, in the case of the JTRS, where radios on aircraft could interface with 
radios on ships and in the hands of infantry, this was an unprecedented degree of 
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interoperation that was central to the JTRS project. Therefore, describing the JTRS as an 
“interoperable architecture” adds information about the central design strategy. 
Interoperable architectures also present some disadvantages. The increased cost 
and complexity of design involved in making an architecture interoperable should not be 
overlooked. In particular, interoperable architectures are difficult to test because the 
boundaries of the system under test are often unclear or difficult to simulate in real-world 
conditions. 
A common issue with implementing interoperability is different implementation of the 
standard. An example is the Link-16 standard message set, which has been implemented 
differently across various systems, resulting in suboptimal interoperability. 
Extensible Architectures 
An extensible architecture is one that makes provision for additional elements to be 
added in the future. In contrast to a flexible architecture, where the guiding strategy involves 
addition and removal as needed, an extensible architecture generally contemplates 
permanent additions.10 A striking example of extensibility is the practice of constructing 
future on-off ramps at the time of construction of highway overpasses. These “ramps to 
nowhere,” which extend only a short distance out from the main bridge, minimize the cost 
and disruption of traffic if another road needs to be connected to the overpass at a future 
time. 
In a DoD context, an example of an extensible architecture is the F-15E Strike Eagle, 
which, when it was built, was built and architected to support four radios but was initially 
fitted only with two. However, the space, the physical interface, and the interface with the 
Operational Flight Program (the software) were all developed and built in at the start. One of 
the two remaining slots has been subsequently filled. The disadvantages to the extensible 
architecture are primarily the additional up-front expense and time of building in the 
extensibility. The extensibility offers an easy target for scope reduction under cost or 
schedule pressure. Extensibility can also be difficult to test in complex systems because the 
elements to be extended are often not created; therefore, testing the interface under realistic 
conditions is difficult. When the government, not the contractor, is the ultimate beneficiary of 
the cost savings of a well-engineered extensible solution, there is little incentive apart from 
compliance testing to ensure that the extensibility is done well. 
Extensibility has a relatively clear definition. It can be distinguished from flexibility 
through the permanence of the extensible addition. It can be distinguished from 
interoperability because at the time the extensible system is created, the system it will 
interoperate with is not yet created. Note that extensibility is very similar to scalability, and 
the two are often interchanged. Two criteria to distinguish the terms are proposed here 
based on our reading of the nuance in usage between the two, but these are by no means 
hard rules. First, extensibility usually refers to a bounded addition, where scalability usually 
refers to arbitrarily large increases in quantity. For example, extensibility could be used in 
the context of adding a second story to a building or an additional lane to a freeway. 
Scalability is more commonly used in information systems when unbounded increases in 
quantity are more feasible. For example, in a computer network architecture, a scalable 
system indicates the ability to add on more nodes arbitrarily. Secondly, scalability also 
                                                
10 No satisfying formal definitions of extensibility could be found in the literature, presumably because 
the term was widely used and understood. Wikipedia states, without citation in its entry on 
extensibility, that “in systems architecture, extensibility means the system is designed to include 
hooks and mechanisms for expanding/enhancing the system with anticipated capabilities without 
having to make major changes to the system infrastructure.” 
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connotes additions that are similar or common to what already exists, where extensibility 
could include provision for something different. For example, an architecture that envisaged 
adding a garage to the side of a house might easily be described as extensible but less 
comfortably as scalable. The ability to duplicate an existing garage would be easier to 
describe as scalable but could probably also be described as extensible. 
Summary of Engineering Literature Definitions 
The definitions suggested previously are summarized in Table 1, highlighting the 
engineering focus of the design strategy, as well as some of the confusing overlaps of the 
terminology used to describe the end result. Note that the end goal is always to deliver the 
desired performance at required costs, and the architectural strategies should be considered 
as a range of tools to achieve that end. 
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 Architectural Strategies 
Architectural 
Strategy 
Main Focus Major Benefits Major Drawbacks 






Higher upfront costs 
Sub-optimal performance 
Modular Interfaces (designed, 
minimized, and 
standardized) 
One-to-one mapping of 
function to form 
Leads to scalability 
Leads to flexibility 
Leads to commonality  
Sub-optimal performance 
Added weight (in some cases) 
Adaptable Changes itself based on 
variations in the 
environment 
More affordable than 
developing different 
products 
May improve survivability, 




May require over-design, 
generic components, extra 
interfaces 
Flexible Gets changed by 
people in reaction to 
changes in environment 
More affordable than 
developing different 
products 
May improve survivability, 




May require over-design, 
generic components, extra 
interfaces 
Robust Continues to deliver 
performance despite 
substantial variations in 
environment 
More affordable than 
developing different 
products 
May improve survivability, 
reliability, or other 
performance characteristics 
Usually more expensive 
Lower performance 
Interoperable Standardizes interfaces Improves performance 
May improve affordability 
through reuse of existing 
network infrastructure 
Effort to correctly interface with 
existing systems 
Perpetuation of legacy 
standards 
Open Necessary design 
information made public 
Encourages innovation that 
may improve affordability or 
performance  
Encourages competition, 
which may improve 
affordability or performance 
Loss of design control, 
intellectual property, and 
project influence by customer 




assuming the extension is 
used 
Higher upfront costs 
Difficult to test in development 
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Selecting and Aligning Architectural Strategies With Acquisition Goals 
Equipped with a better understanding of the architectural strategies, we return to the 
challenge of how the acquisition community can make sense out of these terms and best 
apply an acquisition strategy to achieve the desired end state. The premise of this section is 
that some acquisitions are better suited to some architectural strategies. 
Against the backdrop of several acquisition reform efforts, including the Weapon 
Systems Reform Act of 2009, the 2008 reissuance of DoD Instruction 5000.02 and the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) “Better 
Buying Power” memorandum (Carter, 2010), understanding the interrelation between 
acquisition strategies and architecting strategies becomes increasingly critical. These 
reforms place an increased emphasis on the systems engineering phase, as well as focus 
on cost performance throughout a program’s life cycle (GAO, 2012). The Weapon Systems 
Reform Act of 2009, in particular, places an emphasis on competition throughout the 
program life cycle (GAO, 2012). The result of these efforts is that more time and money is 
being spent prior to system development or production, and more emphasis is being placed 
on competition at all phases, to reduce cost. 
Each acquisition is unique. In attempting to give broad guidance to the acquisition 
community, this paper focuses on two variables that change how acquisitions are conducted 
and which architectural strategies may be most appropriate:11 First, the degree to which 
requirements and environment change from the initial planning to the field-conditions of the 
system; and second, the number of contractors separately involved in delivering the end 
system. We consider a contractor separately involved in the acquisition if it is directly 
responsible to the government customer, rather than acting as a subcontractor. Multiple 
contractors may be introduced because the system under consideration is too large (in 
terms of cost or complexity) to give to a single company or to increase competition in the 
procurement process. Deputy Secretary Carter (2010) has already made the point that he 
wants increased involvement by a larger number of firms under the theory that it lowers 
costs, increases buying flexibility, increases the strength of the industrial base, and leads to 
company-driven innovation (in support of competition). The Weapon Systems Reform Act of 
2009 requires the use of competitive prototypes prior to systems development to be a part of 
the acquisition strategy (GAO, 2012). 
These two variables lead us to ask the following two questions for each of the Eight 
Strategies: 
1. If this architectural strategy is used, how flexible can the procurement be to 
changes in the anticipated operating environment and/or requirements? 
2. If this architectural strategy is used, how difficult is it to involve multiple, 
separate companies? 
The results of asking these questions are presented in Figure 1. 
                                                
11 Of course, other variables may also affect the choice of the architecting strategy, for example, the 
remuneration structure of a contract (choosing from fixed-fee, cost-plus, and incentive-fee, among 
others). The two variables we chose are not as well controlled by government than many other 
factors that affect acquisitions; therefore, the architectural approach needs to be tailored to the 
acquisition variables, rather than the acquisition variables being tailored to the architectural approach. 
For detailed examples on how acquisition variables could be tailored, assuming a commonality 
approach was taken (Wicht, 2011). 
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 Architecting Strategies in Context 
Figure 1 shows that, depending on where across the spectrum a given procurement 
falls, there are generally multiple architecture options that will achieve a good result, but 
there are also architectural approaches that are not well suited. The proposed framework 
described previously is offered as a starting point for identifying potential architecting 
strategies based on where on the spectrum a given acquisition is likely to fall. The 
architecting strategy is directly tied to cost-benefit trades for the product, and as a smart 
buyer and/or as a systems architect, the government must be aware of these architectural 
considerations. A detailed rationale for the position of each entry on the chart in Figure 1 
follows. 
Conventional, Single-Product Design Strategy. Conventional, single-product 
design strategy describes a conventional single product, single contractor development 
process where the government specifies the requirements up front and a single contractor 
produces the product. It has low tolerance to changes in the initial requirements because the 
contractor has no incentive to design outside the requirements given. There are no defined 
interfaces at the government-contractor level, which makes simultaneous competition 
difficult. The intellectual property usually rests with the contractor, which makes competition 
over time difficult. This is the paradigm that the DoD is attempting to leave, but it has a place 
in acquisition. For some small, non-complex procurement, it might be the right strategy. 
Common Strategy. Common design makes it a little easier to introduce multiple 
companies, for example, because a government furnished equipment (GFE) process can be 
used across the common elements of the architecture. One company supplies the 
equipment, and another uses it in the systems it is developing. However, the common 
design is “locked-in,” making it very intolerant to changes in requirements. Any changes 
need to be cascaded through two contract mechanisms, between the government and the 
GFE supplier, and the contractor building the current system. This increases time and cost. 
Interoperable Strategy. The interoperable architecture strategy is intended to allow 
multiple different products to interoperate. Therefore, it is helpful for lowering barriers to 
involving multiple companies. However, the interoperable standard needs to be defined at 
the outset because it defines what aspects of the system must be the same in order to have 
interoperability. The standard is effectively common and brings the inflexibility, which is both 
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the strength and the limitation of a standard. The standard is very difficult to update as 
requirements change, and systems usually ignore the standard and break the chain of 
interoperability in cases of significant requirements change. Note that changing the standard 
is not the same as changing other aspects of the elements that interoperate. For example, 
an aircraft may be upgraded to fly further in response to evolving requirements, but so long 
as the communication system remains unchanged, the interoperability will remain. 
Robust, Flexible, or Adaptable Strategy. These design strategies evolved to allow 
systems to meet changing requirements, even if the requirements are not known at the time 
they are developed. Therefore, the strategies score high on the changing requirements axis. 
However, the principles that are used to evaluate robust, flexible, or adaptable approaches 
must be applied to the system as a whole, using rigorous system engineering techniques 
across the entire end product. This makes it difficult to fragment the system and use multiple 
companies. 
Extensible Strategy. An extensible architecture builds in allowances for changes in 
requirements. However, the changes need to be anticipated at the outset in a way that, for 
example, a flexible architecture does not. It is difficult to build an extensible architecture 
without an idea of what will be extended. However, building a flexible architecture, such as a 
software-defined radio, allows decisions to be made about the changes once the new 
requirements are better known, for example, writing new software. Whether an architecture 
is extensible does not appear to have a significant effect on the involvement of different 
companies in the development of the architecture. Arguably, it makes it slightly easier to 
include additional companies if the extension can be “re-competed.” However, in many 
cases, the degree of knowledge of the original contractor about the system makes it difficult 
for new contractors to be competitive. 
Modular Strategy. A modular architecture minimizes the interfaces between parts of 
a product or system and groups functional areas together. Therefore, a modular architecture 
is more suitable for the involvement of multiple companies because of the ease of 
partitioning work packages. A modular architecture also allows aspects of the architecture to 
be changed out, if necessary, without redesigning the whole system, which makes it 
reasonably tolerant to changes in requirements. 
Open Strategy. An open architecture has low barriers to involving multiple 
companies. There are fewer intellectual property barriers, and companies are free to submit 
bids for pieces of work. An open architecture is ideally changed quickly as requirements 
change because there is a short development cycle due to competition and a minimum of 
formal requirements. It should be noted that open architectures are heavily dependent on 
agreed standards to manage the interfaces between the open development and other parts 
of the system. If the requirement changes necessitate changes in the interfaces and 
standards, then the benefits of openness to dealing with the requirements change are lost. 
The previous analysis suggests that architecting strategies that are chosen largely 
on “hard engineering” concerns actually have implications for the cost and other 
programmatics of the project, and the architecting community needs to start coming to grips 
with which architectures are most useful in which situations. No one acquisitions approach 
can be universally applied to all architecting strategies. The architecting strategies suit 
different acquisition scenarios, and therefore, much thought should go into which type of 
architecting strategy is appropriate for each acquisition. However, due to the overlap of 
some architecting strategies, more than one strategy may be successful for a given 
acquisition. Figure 1 highlights where those architectures are more likely to be successful 
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choices. This underscores Maier and Rechtin’s (2009) central thesis that “engineering is 
more of a science, and architecting is more of an art.” 
Summary 
The terms we have called architecting strategies in this paper—commonality, 
interoperability, modularity, flexibility, extensibility, robustness, adaptability, and modularity—
have all been used at various times as preferred solutions for reducing the cost and 
schedule of government acquisitions of complex systems. 
There has not been a wide and consistent understanding of the full meaning of these 
terms across the acquisition community. In order to use these terms to communicate 
approaches and strategies, all personnel involved must share a common understanding of 
the terminology. Sections I and II of this paper attempted a first step in this direction by 
surveying the literature and engineering practice to arrive at definitions, strengths, and 
weaknesses for the architecting strategies. Even with a common understanding of the 
strategies, a second danger presents itself. That danger lies in a belief that particular 
architecting strategies are the solution for all acquisitions. In fact, as Section III of this paper 
showed, some architecting strategies are better suited to particular acquisition scenarios 
than others. Understanding the interconnections between the architecting strategies and 
acquisition scenarios is essential to making the right decisions at project initiation. The 
importance of getting the architecting strategy right, through good communication of ideas 
and solid understanding of these interconnections, cannot be overemphasized. As Robert 
Spinrad said, “In architecting … all the serious mistakes are made on the first day” (Maier & 
Rechtin, 2009). Spinrad was talking about software, but the apothegm applies equally to 
other forms of complex systems. Better communication and understanding of terminology 
cannot eliminate mistakes altogether, but they represent a good first step. 
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